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1. Introduction
Some accounting experts argued in recent years
that the increased economic importance of intangi-
bles required an overhaul of corporate financial re-
porting.1 The most visible academic reformer was
Baruch Lev (2001: 9), who asserted that funda-
mental changes related to intangibles had trans-
formed the nature of the corporation itself (see also
Stewart, 1997; Teece, 2001):
‘What is new, driving the recent (since the mid-
1980s) surge in intangibles, is the unique combi-
nation of two related economic forces. One is
intensified business competition, brought about
by the globalization of trade and deregulation in
key economic sectors (for example, telecommu-
nications, electricity, transportation, financial
services). The second is the advent of informa-
tion technologies, most recently exemplified by
the Internet. These two fundamental develop-
ments – one economic and political, the other
technological – have dramatically changed the
structure of corporations and have catapulted in-
tangibles into the role of the major value driver
of business in developed economies.’
Several conferences were organised to identify
and assess the problems associated with poor dis-
closure and recognition of accounting intangibles.2
Many practitioners, consultants and regulators ar-
gued that financial statements were inadequate 
because the balance sheet did not report many
valuable intangible assets and concluded that ac-
counting reports needed significant change (e.g.
Edvinsson and Malone, 1997; Sveiby, 1997;
ICAEW, 1998; Leadbeater, 1999; Lev, 2001;
Eccles et al., 2001; Blair and Wallman, 2001;
MERITUM, 2002; Low and Kalafut, 2002).
We take a contrary perspective in this essay and
assert that arguments favoring the expanded re-
porting of intangible asset values in balance sheets
are flawed for three reasons. First, recent times are
not unique in terms of the importance of intangi-
bles. Indeed, intangibles are ubiquitous to human
economic interaction and are present even in
seemingly simple economies. Second, intangibles
are ideas that build on other ideas to generate com-
plementarities and synergies. The consequence of
this is that the value of an individual idea typical-
ly cannot be discerned independently of other
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1 At a US Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs hearing on 19 July 2000, Adapting a 1930s
Financial Reporting Model to the 21st Century, five account-
ing experts all testified that corporate financial reports inade-
quately treated intangible assets, and these had recently grown
considerably (Lev 2001: 7).
2 The OECD has held numerous conferences on intangibles,
such as the International Symposium on Measuring and
Reporting Intellectual Capital: Experience, Issues and Prospects,
Amsterdam, 9–11 June 1999. See http://www.oecd.org/docu-
ment/15/0,3343,en_2649_201185_1943055_1_1_1_1,00.html.
Litan and Wallison (2000) summarise conclusions from 
two conferences on intangibles at the Brookings Institution
and Stanford University. The Intangibles Research 
Center at New York University held four conferences on 
intangibles from 1998–2001 (http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/ross/
events.cfm?doc_id=7049).
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reviewer, Richard Macve, Brian Singleton-Green, Pauline
Weetman (editor) and participants at the 2007 Information for
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Editorial Note
The discussant for this paper was Chris Swinson, Comptroller
and Auditor General of Jersey. A webcast of the session is
available on the website of the ICAEW http://www.icaew.com/
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172 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
Figure 1
An anthropological perspective on different definitions of intangibles
ideas, many of which are not owned by any given
firm. Third, ideas are valuable only to the extent
that they increase wealth or, in accounting parl-
ance, give rise to income. Thus, emphasis on the
balance sheet is itself misplaced, and a return to
measuring income will likely serve financial state-
ment users better than trying to value assets that by
their fundamental nature cannot be independently
valued.
The last 10,000 years have seen the human
species transform from small nomadic hunter-
gatherer bands not far removed from their primate
cousins, chimpanzees and gorillas, to citizens liv-
ing in vast cities of more than 20 million people.
Many civilisations have waxed and waned over
these thousands of years, and living standards have
risen and fallen, often dramatically. However, the
overall trend has been towards improved standards
of living. We argue that human progress has al-
ways reflected accumulated human ingenuity and,
in large part, the cultural mechanisms that people
have developed to accurately store, and subse-
quently accurately transmit, valuable information
across time and space. That is, people always and
everywhere have produced and implemented ideas
to increase their productivity; indeed intangibles
are ubiquitous to human economic interaction.
Accounting intangibles are only a small subset
of valuable economic and cultural intangibles.
Figure 1 depicts the relations between different
kinds of intangibles as a tiered cake viewed from
above. The bottom layer is a set of physical facts
and laws that biological organisms exploit to prop-
agate their species and genes. These natural facts
are largely givens from a human viewpoint, and di-
rectly influence behaviour such as food gathering
and production strategies. As people discover sur-
vival-enhancing facts and routines, they often
imbue this knowledge with religious or moral sig-
nificance, such as taboos or rituals (Burriss, 1929;
Lepowsky, 1987). As a result, new ‘goods’ are cre-
ated – for example, when a particular fruit be-
comes holy. People thus add a layer of cultural
ideas to a subset of the pre-existing natural facts,
and the structure of ideas builds upwards. Ideas
later take on a life independent of their discoverers
and become cultural intangibles – that is, ‘memes’
that compete with each other for survival
(Dawkins, 1976).
Some innovators create wealth by exploiting
natural resources to deliver new goods that people
value, or invent more efficient production and dis-
tribution systems (Schumpeter, 1942; Burgelman
et al., 2001). These entrepreneurs try to make their
services unique and non-duplicable to increase the
value their knowledge will fetch in trade (Teece,
1987). If the legal system recognises and protects
private property rights over the benefits to these
innovations, then a firm can report the property
rights it owns or controls on the balance sheet as
intangible assets. Enforceable private property
rights suffice for the balance sheet reporting of ac-
counting intangibles under current practice, al-
though the reported values typically approximate
CULTURAL FACTS
ECONOMIC
RESOURCES
ACCOUNTING
INTANGIBLES
PROPERTY RIGHTS
BIOLOGICAL FACTS
PHYSICAL FACTS
LIFE
ENERGY
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market values only if they were recently acquired
externally.3 Thus, we define accounting intangibles
as the legally excludable subset of economic intan-
gibles, which are in turn defined as the subset of
those cultural intangibles that directly or indirectly
generate consumable goods or services. The broad-
er sets of intangibles provide useful benchmarks
for assessing if accounting intangibles owned by
corporations have become more important recently.
The consequence of this broader perspective is
that accounting intangibles must be examined
holistically with a clear recognition that the value
of an individual idea is not separable from the
complementary ideas that enabled its creation. The
accumulation of ideas means that what was once
novel eventually becomes routinised and mun-
dane. Furthermore, new knowledge provides ideas
for new goods, and these new tangible assets in-
corporate and embody the once intangible idea.
Improvements in tangible assets arise from com-
bining new ideas with the ideas that originally
gave rise to the assets, which generates synergies
and complementarities that are difficult to appor-
tion to the constituent ideas, many of which have
different owners.
Ideas are economically valuable only to the ex-
tent that they lead to an increase in wealth, the ac-
counting analogue of which is to generate income.
However, in addition to complementarities among
intangibles, these assets typically generate wealth
indirectly through the tangible assets that embody
them. Thus, their value is often inseparable from
the tangible assets that incorporate them. Firms
also benefit immensely from valuable intangibles,
such as rule of law, that are shared by all citizens,
and others, such as human capital, that firms do not
own but merely rent from their employees. Thus,
any attempt to report economically valuable intan-
gibles as assets on corporate balance sheets is like-
ly to be a futile exercise for the majority of intan-
gibles. Hence, we believe that accounting is better
served by measuring the income that intangibles
generate, which can provide more informative in-
puts for firm valuation. This view is fully consis-
tent with more traditional views of assets as cost
investments made in anticipation of future eco-
nomic benefits (Littleton, 1929; 1935; 1952).
The paper is organised as follows. The ubiquity
of intangibles is illustrated with an example from
anthropology in Section 2. The lack of separabili-
ty and the dynamics of intangible creation and
storage are described in Section 3. Section 4 pro-
vides an analysis of the wealth creation role of 
intangibles in modern economies. We discuss evi-
dence on whether the value and importance of in-
tangibles has actually increased in Section 5. Some
concluding remarks are provided in Section 6.
2. The ubiquity of intangibles: an example
from a simple exchange economy
Adam Smith (1776) recognised exchange and di-
vision of labour as the sources of human econom-
ic progress when he wrote:
‘This division of labor, from which so many ad-
vantages are derived, is not originally the effect
of any human wisdom, which foresees and in-
tends that general opulence to which it gives oc-
casion. It is the necessary, though very slow and
gradual, consequence of a certain propensity in
human nature which has in view no such exten-
sive utility; the propensity to truck, barter, and
exchange one thing for another.’
This quotation makes us think of familiar insti-
tutions: firms that coordinate specialised produc-
tion and markets where the output of production is
exchanged against money.
A sole focus on modern institutions is too nar-
row to grasp the genesis of what Smith refers to as
a ‘propensity in human nature’ to exchange and the
nature and magnitude of economic gains that result
from such propensities. The propensity to ex-
change is represented in its most primitive form as
a gift (Mauss, 1950). Most gifts are resource trans-
fers where the recipient of the gift is expected to
reciprocate in the future. The exchange of ceremo-
nial gifts and their unstated but powerful expecta-
tion of reciprocity are the bases upon which human
economies evolve from modest beginnings
(Boulding et al., 1972; Sahlins, 1972).4
One example of a gift economy is the Moka
economy of the Mount Hagen area of the Western
Highlands of New Guinea, subjected to ethno-
graphic study by Andrew Strathern (1971).5 The
Hageners live in settlements controlled by smaller
clans within several large tribes of sizes ranging
from less than 100 to nearly 7,000 persons
Vol. 38 No. 3 2008 International Accounting Policy Forum. 173
3 See footnote 8 for a discussion of our definition, which es-
sentially combines the notion of separability with the recogni-
tion criteria in IAS 38 (IASC, 1998) and is similar to US
practice under SFAS 2 (FASB, 1975).
4 Modern economies contain large gift exchange sectors
where reciprocation is usually expected. Gift giving in modern
societies reflects deep-seated cultural norms that hark back to
ancestral gift economies characterised by generalised reci-
procity (Sahlins, 1972). Gift exchange in modern economies
also generates both demand for and supply of innovation.
Roberts (2005) argues that people give unique gifts to demon-
strate how much the giver values the recipient. Some people
may express this uniqueness by making their own gifts and in
the process hone their hobby skills. These part-time hobbyists
may eventually convert their hobbies into part-time jobs.
While experimenting with new ideas and techniques to main-
tain uniqueness, these hobbyists may discover new artistic
and/or technical skills that allow them to become full-time
producers who eventually compete on artistic and technical
design features with other specialist producers.
5 Other economies built around elaborate gift exchange cus-
toms include Kula gift exchange in the Trobriand Islands
(Malinowski, 1922) and the Potlatch of Indians in the
American Northwest and Siberia (Mauss, 1950; Suttles, 1960).
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(Strathern, 1971: 230–231). The Hagener econo-
my is agricultural, with the food staples being
pork, sweet potatoes, and a few other vegetables,
such as bananas, sugar cane, taro, yams, maize and
cassava. Women do most of the work in child rear-
ing, care and feeding of the family’s pigs, and on-
going care and harvesting of the gardens
(Strathern, 1971: 8–10). Men clear the land for
planting and build fences and ditches around the
gardens. They also spend much of their time
preparing for, participating in, and developing the
complex social networks that sustain Moka.
The ‘Big Man’ is a prominent player in the
Hagener society. A Big Man holds a position of
status and leadership based on a reputation for
trustworthiness and wisdom built up from past
successful Moka exchange.6 Any given clan will
include one (or a few) major Big Man along with,
typically, several lesser Big Men (Strathern:
187–213). The status of Big Man can be lost since
a Big Man faces stiff competition from others in
making successful Moka and sustaining a network
of followers.
Strathern (1971: 10–14 and 93–229) describes
Hagener Moka exchange, which is a ceremonial
gift exchange that takes place over several rounds
of exchange. Preparation for a successful Moka
exchange takes several months. An initiating gift is
made to build alliances between tribes, to make
payments to a bride’s family or for reparations for
death in warfare, and, in some cases, for more rou-
tine exchanges. An initiating gift must be recipro-
cated with a gift of greater value, which consists of
a payment of the debt created by the initial gift and
a residual. This residual above the original debt is
the Moka provided by the gift. This series of gift
exchanges is continued as long as the current gift
exceeds that of the prior round. The items ex-
changed in a Moka transaction include pigs and
pork meat, marsupials and their meat and furs, cas-
sowaries (a bird indigenous to New Guinea) and
their meat and plumes, axes, salt, decorating oils,
and various forms of attractive shells (e.g. pearl
shells, cowries, etc.).7
Wealth in the Hagener society results from ani-
mal husbandry of pigs, as well as the hunting of
other animals, cultivation of crops, and the acqui-
sition of valuables from external trade. The social
value generated by Moka exchange depends on
others contributing valuables to the transaction,
which requires that network members defer their
own consumption or work harder to produce the
items that will be given away in the exchange. To
secure this cooperation, the Big Man must con-
vince others that his Moka will be successful and
that he will be able to return something of greater
value to them in the future. In other words, Moka
becomes a positive sum game through the organi-
sational skill and effort of the Big Man.
Turning now to the ‘accounting’ problem, the
tangible assets of the Hagener economy include
agricultural implements, seeding for sweet pota-
toes, a stock of pigs that can be bred, housing stock
(for both pigs and humans), and other assets (e.g.
guard dogs) to protect the pigs from predators and
poachers. The community’s most valuable asset is
the stock of knowledge of community members
about existing production technologies (e.g. plant-
ing and husbandry), as well as knowledge about
the socioeconomic arrangements that enable coor-
dinated production and exchange (i.e. the commu-
nity’s economic intangibles).
This economic intangible or knowledge asset is
fundamentally different from a tangible asset in
that its existence cannot be verified merely by 
visual inspection of the person carrying the knowl-
edge. Rather, the asset’s existence is only demon-
strable by observing the economic transactions
coordinated by the individual carrying the knowl-
edge. In this sense, the important financial meas-
ure for someone evaluating the effectiveness of the
Moka system is the economic value created
through the specialised division of labour that is
enabled by exchange. The measurement issue is one
of identifying the value added by use of the assets
(i.e. income) rather than valuing the asset per se.
Returning to the economics of the problem re-
quires that we think seriously about how institu-
tions develop to enable economic gains. These
institutions, whether we call them markets, firms,
networks, or legal systems, define the rules of
competition used to secure human prosperity
(Coase, 1937, 1960; Schelling, 1995; North,
2005). The main ‘assets’ that humans have ex-
ploited to secure this prosperity are ideas that can
be translated into actions to produce consumption
goods or more productive tangible assets that ful-
fill longer term purposes.
These ideas, and the institutions that result, have
long path-dependent histories. The roots of mod-
ern economies based on reciprocity lie in the gift
exchange economies of more primitive societies
(Boulding et al., 1972). Modern economies
evolved from primitive economies by creating,
storing and diffusing human knowledge in ways
that made economic interactions more fruitful, and
that ultimately led to vast improvements in eco-
174 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
6 The sons of Big Men often become Big Men themselves,
but the role of Big Man is not an inherited position. Rather,
sons of Big Men are more likely to succeed by emulating those
qualities in their fathers that made them successful in Moka
and other activities, like building networks and alliances with
other clans and providing leadership in making peace or insti-
gating war.
7 The shells served a monetary function in that they could
be traded for other commodities in routine trade outside the
Moka. The use of shells as money is not unique to the
Hageners; for example, the wampum of Native Americans
were shells that served as money (Szabo, 2005).
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nomic welfare (e.g. Nelson and Phelps, 1966;
Kremer, 1993). Accumulated human knowledge
allows us, for example, to transform sand into
glass or silicon chips, thereby transforming an al-
most boundless supply of cheap raw materials into
valuable art objects or work tools.
The main conclusion from this section is that
modern economies have distant roots in the past,
and one source of this connection is the ubiquity of
economic intangibles. This is important because it
suggests that if modern complex economies are
different in their use of economic intangibles, the
difference is one of degree rather than of kind.
3. Non-separability and the dynamics of
intangibles creation
In this section, we discuss the dynamic processes
that lead to the creation, storage, diffusion and
preservation of different kinds of intangibles. This
is necessary to illustrate how accounting intangi-
bles in most cases are not separable from other as-
sets. Before we proceed, we briefly return to
Figure 1 to define accounting, economic and cul-
tural intangibles and their interrelationships.
3.1. Defining different sets of intangibles
Accountants typically distinguish intangible as-
sets from other assets based on them not having
physical substance and not representing purely fi-
nancial contracts (investments). In addition, ac-
countants typically describe intangible assets as
having highly uncertain and ambiguous future
benefits. This rationalises the common practice of
expensing the costs of most internally developed
intangibles as they are incurred rather than defer-
ring the expenditures as assets to match against fu-
ture revenues, for example, IAS 38 (IASC, 1998).
We define an accounting intangible as the legally
recognised right to exclusively exploit an idea for
a defined time period to generate cash inflows.8
Some innovators prefer to use informal mecha-
nisms rather than the legal system to protect the
fruits of their ideas. For example, Coca-Cola has
not patented its formula and relies on trade secre-
cy, while magicians (Loshin, 2007) and French
chefs (Fauchart and von Hippel, 2006) rely on so-
cial norms to protect their valuable intellectual
property. As such, these economically valuable
ideas were not reported as assets on balance
sheets, and even following recent changes in ac-
counting for intangibles (SFAS 141 and IAS 38),
are likely to be recognised only as part of purchase
accounting for a business combination.
Growth economists like Solow (1956) and Lucas
(2002) identify ideas and knowledge as having the
largest impact on human economic progress.
Romer (1990) identifies several features of knowl-
edge intangibles that distinguish them from physi-
cal assets as well as public goods. One important
feature is that economic intangibles tend to be non-
rival: consumption by one person does not preclude
consumption by another because there is no physi-
cal feature that is transformed by consumption. For
example, many cooks can use instructions such as
recipes simultaneously, but only one cook at a time
can use a particular knife or utensil (Warsh, 2006).
Importantly, economic intangibles create value by
better use of complementary tangible and intangi-
ble assets. Because they can be expressed as digital
bits that are cheap to copy, economic intangibles
tend to have high fixed costs and low marginal
costs of production. Economic intangibles tend to
be unique almost by definition, making it relative-
ly difficult to set up organised markets for trans-
acting in them. Network effects sometimes
characterise economic intangibles in that their
value increases with the number of users, such as
a standard like uniform bar codes. For present pur-
poses, we define an economic intangible as an idea
that ultimately helps produce valuable goods and
services for consumption either directly or indi-
rectly. A representative example of an economic
intangible is the design of a new good or service.
While both economic intangibles and public goods
are non-rival, public goods are non-excludable
whereas economic intangibles can be made (par-
tially) excludable by legal protections or by en-
cryption, secrecy or social norms (Romer, 1990).
Ideas that contribute to the survival and devel-
opment of a society are also valuable even though
they may not directly yield tradable goods and
services. For instance, personal hygiene norms
slow the spread of communicable diseases and 
increase the viability of a culture. We define a 
cultural intangible as an idea or mental construct
that is preserved and transmitted across time, and
enhances the survival fitness of persons within the
culture. Accounting intangibles are a legally pro-
tected subset of economic intangibles, which are in
turn a subset of those cultural ideas that directly or
indirectly generate consumable goods and servic-
es. These broader sets of intangibles are useful
benchmarks for assessing whether the accounting
Vol. 38 No. 3 2008 International Accounting Policy Forum. 175
8 This definition is consistent with US practice (SFAS 2:
FASB, 1975) as well as the narrower concept of separability in
IAS 38 (IASC 1998). Under purchase accounting for business
combinations (e.g. IFRS 3: IASB 2004; SFAS 141: FASB
2001), residual values needed to balance journal entries are la-
belled goodwill, which are then categorised as intangible as-
sets. Because these residual values have unidentifiable sources
and indefinite lives and could be mere accounting artefacts,
we exclude them from our theoretical analysis. Both SFAS
141 and IAS 38 require that firms allocate purchase account-
ing residual values to several asset categories and subcate-
gories (at a reporting segment level) that were previously not
recognised on balance sheets, such as customer relations and
unpatented trade secrets. These allocations and estimates are
almost surely very noisy partitions of the residual value, so we
discuss them no further.
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subset owned by corporations has increased in im-
portance recently.
3.2. Creation of accounting intangibles
Accounting intangibles result from a dynamic
process where facts about the natural world are
discovered (cultural intangibles or basic research),
converted into economic goods and services (ap-
plied research or invention) and commercially ex-
ploited (innovation), and eventually monopolised
as exclusive legal rights to benefit from an idea.
Thus, increases in the quantity or value of ac-
counting intangibles can arise from increases in
the total set of cultural intangibles holding conver-
sion rates constant, or increases in the fraction of
cultural intangibles that inventors convert into
consumable goods and services, or changes in the
legal and enforcement system that make formal
legal protection preferable to informal protection
of valuable economic ideas.
To begin our analysis of accounting intangibles
creation, consider a well-known accounting intan-
gible – Edison’s patent for the electric light bulb.
Light was created as a physical fact at the Big
Bang nearly 14 billion years ago (Spergel et al.,
2003). Animals began using light when they de-
veloped sight about 530 million years ago (Parker,
2003). About 1.4 million years ago, our hominid
ancestors learned to control fire to ward off preda-
tors, cook food and create cave paintings (Uhlig,
2001: 11). Humans developed fuel lamps about
70,000 years ago, and candles were invented 5,000
years ago to provide brighter and better-controlled
illumination (Uhlig, 2001: 20). Gas streetlights re-
placed candles in 1820 (in Pall Mall, London) and
electric light bulbs provided light after Swann and
Edison’s 1879 invention of the carbon-filament in-
candescent lamp. Nordhaus (1997) estimates that
the labour hours needed to buy 1,000 lumens of
light in 2000 was about 1/10,000 of its price in
1800, which in turn was 1/10 its price in 2000 B.C.
Babylon, indicating that light technology has im-
proved dramatically over the past 200 years.
The discovery of fire control, and basic research
more generally, was probably motivated by intrin-
sic curiosity. Galenson (2005) argues that the ca-
reers of great artists follow two different paths.
Experimental innovators, such as Michelangelo,
work gradually by trial and error, and arrive at their
major contributions later in life. By contrast, con-
ceptual innovators, such as Picasso, make sudden
breakthroughs by formulating new ideas, usually at
an early age. Jones (2007a) analyses the careers of
great inventors and Nobel Prize winners and finds
that the mean age at which great breakthroughs
were made has increased by six years over the 20th
century. This is a consequence of an increased ‘bur-
den of knowledge’ that new innovators must mas-
ter before they reach the frontiers of their research
areas (Jones, 2007b). This is reflected in increased
times to earn Ph.D.s, greater specialisation within
subject areas, and increased reliance on teamwork
for innovation (Wuchty et al., 2007).9
Important scientific discoveries are not distrib-
uted uniformly across societies or through time, but
rather appear in clusters in a non-monotonic and
punctuated evolutionary process. A more-populated
society likely has a larger knowledge store of phys-
ical facts and observed regularities, which discover-
ers can seek to better understand (Simon, 2000). In
this sense, human population (or more accurately,
their combined knowledge) is the ultimate resource
(Simon, 1981). A society possessing more people
with the health, education and leisure to devote
purely to research is likely to have better chances
of discovering basic ideas, since specialised divi-
sion of labour is generally more efficient (Smith,
1776). Societies where more discoverers work in
close physical proximity are more likely to reap
the benefits of complementarities and synergies in
the generation and refinement of ideas (e.g.
Kelley, 1972). This is why cities have historically
been hubs of discovery and innovation (Jacobs,
1969, 1984; Bairoch, 1988). Basic research is more
likely to flourish in societies that value knowledge
and reward new discoveries, and large civilisations
are likely to have a greater diversity of rewards that
appeal to different explorers. Finally, more peaceful
and stable societies are better able to reduce the eco-
nomic uncertainty associated with exploring the
frontiers of knowledge (North, 2005).
Inventors and especially innovators tend to be
more motivated by monetary rewards. The entre-
preneur seeks to exploit his local or specific
knowledge of demand and supply to generate eco-
nomic profits (Hayek, 1945). Risk-tolerant entre-
preneurs tend to experiment with their products
and processes to develop the proverbial better
mousetrap. Entrepreneurs monitor and learn from
their environments, and are generally quick to im-
itate successful competitors.10 The entrepreneurial
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9 Gurven et al. (2006) document that while adult physical
size is necessary for basic hunting ability in hunter-gatherer
societies, developing sufficient skill to track and capture im-
portant prey items generally takes 10 or 20 years after achiev-
ing adult body size, indicating that mastering a large body of
specialised knowledge is very valuable even in primitive soci-
eties.
10 Schumpeter (1939: 100) provides a similar account to
ours, ‘Considerations of this type [the difficulty of coping with
new things] entail the consequence that whenever a new pro-
duction function has been set up successfully and the trade be-
holds the new things done and its major problems solved, it
becomes easier for people to do the same thing and even im-
prove upon it. In fact, they are driven to copying it if they can,
and some people will do so forthwith. [Hence, it follows that]
innovations do not remain isolated events, and are not evenly
distributed in time, but that on the contrary they tend to clus-
ter, to come about in bunches, simply because first some, and
then most, firms follow in the wake of successful innovation.’
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risk-taker is usually more interested in knowing
how well something works rather than understand-
ing precisely why it works. Competition between
entrepreneurs provides the incentives for discov-
ery of new economic goods and services (Hayek,
1968).
Because entrepreneurs constantly borrow and 
incorporate the ideas of others, ideas are continu-
ously reshuffled and recombined, often in far-
removed locales. As risk-taking entrepreneurs are
tested by competition, weak ideas are weeded out
by business failures in a process similar to natural
selection acting on genes (Alchian, 1950). Ideas
become adapted to their environment, but they
may also ‘exapt’, whereby a response to one prob-
lem turns out sometimes by accident to solve a dif-
ferent problem (Dawkins, 1976). For example,
frozen popsicles were invented by accident in
1905 after a soda maker accidentally left a batch of
drink outdoors overnight and it froze (Ng, 2007).
Environmental changes, whether natural or cultur-
al, also likely play a major role in knowledge cre-
ation. For instance, many archaeologists believe
that an Ice Age about 40,000 years ago provided
the stimulus for art and spoken language
(Appenzeller, 1998; Holden, 1998), while the most
recent Ice Age, ending about 12,000 years ago,
sparked agriculture (Pringle, 1998; Mithen, 2004).
Since environmental changes are infrequent and
unpredictable, this could in part explain why idea
creation is not uniformly distributed over time.
3.3. Storage, diffusion, and preservation of 
intangibles
The strong complementarity inherent to intangi-
bles implies that their creation will be most pro-
nounced when ideas are widely known and shared
among the developers of new ideas. The econom-
ic value of ideas depends on the ultimate consumer
surplus they generate, which is increasing in the
total number of consumers served now and into the
future. Effective storage, diffusion, and preserva-
tion of intangibles are thus necessary for current
knowledge to be leveraged to develop new ideas
and exploit their potential within and between so-
cieties (Kuznets, 1966: 290).
Historically, geographical barriers such as
mountains, rivers and oceans have restricted
movement of people and hence have slowed the
spread of ideas from one society to another. To the
extent that neighboring areas had very different
climates and natural resources, ideas that were
useful in one area might not be valuable in anoth-
er.11 Historically separated human populations fre-
quently have different languages and cultures,
which can inhibit diffusion even when contact be-
tween societies occurs. At the same time, traders
such as Marco Polo, missionaries like David
Livingstone, adventurers like Christopher
Columbus, and warriors like Alexander the Great
have left home to seek their fortunes, taking their
customs and ideas with them to new lands
(Chanda, 2007). While such ventures have been
episodic, they have been part of human history
since modern man migrated out of Africa about
100,000 years ago.
Ideas can be communicated more accurately by
cultures with a more developed spoken and written
language, which promotes preservation and trans-
mission across generations (Donald, 1991; Pinker,
2003). Standardised weights, measures, and nu-
merals make it possible to develop recipes and for-
mulas as shorthand for storing successful
combinations of ideas. Improved representation of
abstract ideas ensures near-exact duplication of
successful processes, and the improved organisa-
tion of production increases efficiency (Kuznets,
1966). An effective legal system protects both tan-
gible and intangible assets, and can increase the
expected returns to innovation (Spar, 2001; North,
2005). Likewise, governments that are open to
trade with other societies increase their citizens’
exposure to new ideas.
The ideas that underlie intangibles may not last
forever. Accounting intangibles can get destroyed
if their legal protection is removed by private liti-
gation, a law that changes the terms of patent or
copyright protection, government nationalisation,
and so on. Economic intangibles can be destroyed
by state regulation, taxes or tariffs, as well as by
lax governmental protection of property, which
makes piracy of ideas more attractive than produc-
tion for exchange.12 Cultural intangibles can be de-
stroyed by external conquest, the rise of new
religions, or environmental changes that lead to
widespread disease or natural disasters. Rapid
technological change could also result in over-con-
sumption of natural resources and environmental
collapse, forcing a society to resettle (Tainter,
1988; Diamond, 2004).
More generally, extensive government power
enables rent-seekers who prefer to expropriate oth-
ers’ wealth rather than create their own through
personal initiative (Olson, 1965). Corrupt govern-
ment officials utilise bureaucratic red tape to ex-
tract bribes that reduce economic efficiency and
the value of intangibles (de Soto, 1989, 2000;
Buchanan and Yoon, 2000). Predatory or ideologi-
cal governments are especially dangerous in that
they usually target the successful entrepreneurs for
expropriation to protect entrenched interest groups
Vol. 38 No. 3 2008 International Accounting Policy Forum. 177
11 Diamond (1997) argues that agricultural and animal hus-
bandry technologies were more likely to spread along the
same latitudes in Eurasia with similar climates than along the
same longitudes in Africa and South America.
12 Technological obsolescence may constitute a net gain in
intangibles and is an indispensable part in the process of ‘cre-
ative destruction’ (Schumpeter, 1942).
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(Rajan and Zingales, 2003).
The main point from our discussion in Section 3
is that societies that possess large numbers of tal-
ented, educated, and risk-tolerant people best fos-
ter the creation of intangibles. This is leveraged by
networks that promote the development and diffu-
sion of ideas that build on past knowledge and sur-
vive the selection pressures of competition. The
most notable feature of settings conducive to in-
tangibles is the extensive complementarities and
synergies between new ideas, concurrent develop-
ments, and accumulated knowledge from the past.
The practical accounting implication of these com-
plementarities and synergies is that the value of a
specific accounting intangible is not in general
separable from the culture, economy, and organi-
sation within which it will be employed. Thus,
even if intangibles have grown in importance, it is
not obvious that they can be valued accurately as
independent assets.
4. The economic role of intangibles in
modern economies: wealth creation
In this section we discuss the implications of in-
tangibles for wealth creation within modern
economies. We begin by discussing the role of
government and developed markets for exchange,
since both are precursors to large-scale corporate
organisations. We then describe the wealth cre-
ation role of intangibles in the modern corporation.
4.1. Government and the emergence of market 
exchange
Productive efficiency implies that individuals
produce more than they can consume. Surplus pro-
duction also generates incentives for other individ-
uals to expropriate others’ output rather than
producing it themselves. Effective political organ-
isations like governments essentially monopolise
coercion. Olson (1993) argues that a roving bandit
in an anarchical stage has an incentive to take
whatever his victims have. However, a bandit
leader can also choose to seize and hold a given
area, by which he would benefit from voluntarily
limiting his thefts and providing a peaceful order
so that others within his sphere of control have an
incentive to invest and produce. In this conception,
a short-horizon roving bandit has an incentive to
make himself a long-horizon public-good-provid-
ing monarch (McGuire and Olson, 1996). This
‘public choice’ conception of government
(Buchanan and Tullock, 1962) has led to
metaphors such as a ‘visible boot’ or ‘grabbing
hand’ for rent-seeking individuals who use the
power of government to expropriate wealth (Frye
and Shleifer, 1997).
While dictatorships are not the only form of gov-
ernment, Olson (1965) shows that rent-seeking in-
dividuals will always try to cartelise valuable
goods and services. For instance, occupational
groups lobby for licensing or certification to create
an oligopsony for their services and raise their av-
erage group incomes without providing any higher
quality of service (Stigler, 1971; Kleiner, 2006). In
countries with powerful governments, it is impor-
tant to have access to political power that can en-
able beneficial private action. When government
agencies compete with each other, we frequently
observe an ‘anti-commons’ problem where prof-
itable actions will not be taken because of exces-
sive bureaucratic obstacles to overcome, even with
bribes or lobbying (De Soto, 1989, 2000;
Buchanan and Yoon, 2000). The result is that peo-
ple choose to conduct economic exchanges in
black markets, typically paying local gangs for
protection (Frye and Shleifer, 1997).
North et al. (2006) provide an integrated view of
political and economic organisation wherein the
natural state of government is a limited access so-
cial order that restricts competition to create rents,
which in turn provide the foundation for stable po-
litical organisations. By contrast, they suggest that
more recent periods have seen the emergence of
open access orders, where political stability and
economic growth are achieved through economic
and political competition. North et al. argue that
the emergence of open access orders involves a
lengthy developmental process where co-evolu-
tion of political and economic institutions incre-
mentally leads to wider access to potential
economic gains and increased competition for
such gains among various actors within an econo-
my. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note
that open access orders with governments that pro-
mote competition and protect property rights are
essential for the value of intangible assets within
an economy to be realised.
Modern economies contain large, developed
market-exchange sectors that could plausibly be
viewed as natural extensions of gift economies
(Roberts, 2005) and are more likely to flourish
under open access orders. As the number of group
members grows within a society, repeated interac-
tion with familiar partners occurs less often
(Dunbar, 2001). In addition, individual cooperation
with members of other groups cannot rely on fa-
miliarity or repeated interaction. At some point in
the recent human past, a new form of economic in-
teraction arose in the form of bilateral exchange or
barter (Seabright, 2004) with an associated norm of
balanced reciprocity (Sahlins, 1972). Put different-
ly, in a market-exchange economy, reciprocity and
sharing is expected only between trading partners,
and no claims are made upon the community at
large, unlike the norm in a gift economy.
A market economy is more likely to develop
with more extensive division of labour and spe-
cialised production of goods and services because
178 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
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members of the society need to interact with more
individuals to procure everything they demand for
their daily living. Like many important human in-
stitutions, the market economy was never designed
by individuals but, rather, emerged spontaneously.
As Friedrich Hayek (1979: 164) notes, ‘We have
never designed our economic system. We were not
intelligent enough for that.’ In other words, mar-
kets are ‘grown’ institutions that emerge and 
develop as conditions change to permit mutually
advantageous exchange. Further, the emergence
and development of markets is inexorably tied to
opportunities and incentives that encourage inno-
vation through economic competition.
4.2. Intangibles and wealth creation by corporate
organisations
Human societies increase in size because of in-
creased economic efficiency associated with divi-
sion of labour that makes more effective use of
knowledge held by group members. Modern
economies have a wide range of business organi-
sations, ranging from the individual entrepreneur
through the mom-and-pop grocery store, small
family business, partnerships, private companies
and publicly traded multinationals. Within these
organisations, production is planned and imple-
mented by the owner(s) and/or their managers
(Coase, 1937). That is, a business organisation is
guided by management’s ‘visible hand’ (Chandler,
1977) rather than the ‘invisible hand’ envisioned
by Adam Smith (1776).
Business organisations compete for resources in
a constantly changing business environment, and
the organisations that survive are those that have
best adapted to their environment, whether con-
sciously or unconsciously (Alchian, 1950). While
these organisations trade with others for goods and
services on markets, they also internalise produc-
tion through horizontal or vertical integration.
Coase (1937) argues that the reason we don’t all
work and live in a single firm is that the transac-
tions costs of organisation increase with firm size
and eventually overwhelm even the most efficient
managers.
In a Coasean world firms exist because they ex-
ploit opportunities to organise production and final
exchange with customers in a more cost effective
fashion than would be the case for a series of trans-
actions between sub-contractors on a market.
Whether a firm survives and prospers depends on
whether it can locate customers and convince them
to transact for a price that covers the firm’s costs.
In this sense, the entrepreneurial function is one of
combining ideas, knowledge and information to
efficiently coordinate production and deliver
goods and services. Accounting plays a central
role in supporting management decisions that try
to guide the firm towards greater profitability
(Sombart, 1919; Littleton, 1928; Alchian, 1950).
In short, the entrepreneurial role is to discover
ways to exploit economic intangibles in combina-
tion with other assets to generate profits.
The main point here is that the value of intangi-
bles to the firm is to enable wealth creation by ex-
ploiting previously unknown opportunities.
Economist Thomas Schelling (1995) states this
idea clearly as:
‘It has become fashionable in the last two
decades, not only among economists but among
those who like to quote economics, to advert to
an incontestable absolute truth colloquially ex-
pressed as: there is no free lunch … I prefer the
alternative truth, that there are free lunches all
over waiting to be discovered or created. What I
have in mind is what we call Pareto improve-
ments, or the gains from trade. There are non-
zero sum games that permeate the economy that
have settled into, or have been forced into inef-
ficient equilibria.’
Stated differently, the essential notion here is
that economic benefits are best discovered by in-
novative organisations that exploit better ideas to
create wealth. Intangibles are the basic ideas that
fuel this discovery process, and their economic
value is not independent of the economic setting in
which these ideas will be used. Thus, a major point
of relevance for accountants is: The truly impor-
tant feature of intangibles is the wealth they gener-
ate, not their estimated economic value in
exchange on asset markets that likely do not exist
because of asset uniqueness and non-separability.
5. Recent changes in the value and 
importance of intangibles
We have developed a priori arguments in the three
prior sections about why the exclusion of account-
ing intangibles from financial reporting is not like-
ly a cause for major concern. We now shift to 
an empirical focus to discuss evidence on whether
the role of accounting intangibles in modern
economies is greater than it has been previously.
As discussed previously in Section 3, increases
in accounting intangibles can result from increases
in cultural intangibles that are converted into valu-
able economic goods and services through new
ideas. Accordingly, we first discuss changes in the
importance of cultural and economic intangibles.
We then consider empirical evidence on the im-
portance of accounting intangibles.
5.1. Changes in cultural intangibles
Cultural intangibles help a society survive and
thrive, and result in higher measures of population
success. An obvious measure of cultural intangi-
bles is population growth, measured by taking a
census, as it speaks directly to the ability of a so-
Vol. 38 No. 3 2008 International Accounting Policy Forum. 179
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ciety to extend its members’ lifespan. More broad-
ly, it reflects a society’s ability to exercise control
over its environment, which allows it to extract
gains from cooperation that arise through the coor-
dination provided by organisations and market ex-
change (North, 2005).
Average life spans differ across human popula-
tions primarily because of large differences in
death rates during childbirth and infancy rather
than the small differences in the proportion of per-
sons that live to an advanced age. Obviously, bet-
ter health care increases disease survival rates at
all ages and increases average life spans.
Childhood and adolescent nutrition affects physi-
cal development and affects mental and physical
capabilities in adulthood (Fogel, 2004). Since both
physical and mental abilities are crucial to master-
ing even basic food-gathering technologies such as
hunting, even a simple society can easily be disad-
vantaged by poor nutrition (Gurven et al., 2006).
Life expectancies vary considerably around the
world.13 The most developed regions, such as
North America, Western Europe, Australia and
Japan have the longest average life spans of 75 and
higher. The developing countries of Asia, Eastern
Europe and South America have average life spans
in the 60s and 70s, while the underdeveloped
countries of Africa lag behind, with average life
spans in the 50s or less. These disparities are 
remarkable given expanded access to modern
medical technology, and at least partially reflect
political barriers to the diffusion of the fruits of
such knowledge.14
Average life spans have evolved differently
around the world during the last half century. In
1950, mean life span was nearly 70 in North
America, about 65 in Europe and Oceania, in the
low 50s in South and Central America, in the low
40s in Asia and North Africa, and the high 30s in
Sub-Saharan Africa. Endemic tropical diseases
like malaria and sleeping sickness and unfavorable
climates account at least partially for Africa lag-
ging behind the rest of the world (Diamond, 1997).
Over the last 55 years, there has been considerable
global convergence in average life spans with the
sole exception of Sub-Saharan Africa. Average life
spans grew monotonically all over the world ex-
cept for a decline in Sub-Saharan Africa since the
late 1980s, primarily due to the spread of AIDS.
By 2005, Asia and North Africa had added more
than 20 years to average life spans and had sur-
passed the mean life span of Europe and Oceania
in 1950.
Thus, diffusion of cultural intangibles has oc-
curred at a tremendous speed around the world,
with the notable exception of Sub-Saharan Africa.
Kenny (2005) reviews data on a number of other
cultural intangibles, such as literacy and gender in-
equality, and finds that most indicators around the
world have converged throughout the 20th centu-
ry.15 Rosling (2006, 2007) demonstrates, using UN
data, how closely measures of cultural innovation,
such as child survival rates, correlate with meas-
ures of economic innovation, such as per capita
GDP both over time and around the world. Rosling
also demonstrates that socio-cultural indicators
have converged more rapidly than economic indi-
cators, suggesting that economic innovation tends
to lag cultural diffusion.16
The growth in cultural intangibles can be quan-
tified in economic values. Murphy and Topel
(2006) estimate that the cumulative gains in
longevity over the 20th century were worth about
$1.2 million per person for both men and women
(based on US individuals’ willingness to pay).
Between 1970 and 2000, increased longevity
added about $3.2 trillion per year to US national
wealth, equal to about half of average annual GDP
over the period. Thus, the evidence suggests that
considerable improvements in cultural intangibles
have occurred over the course of the past century.
5.2. Changes in economic intangibles
Economic intangibles are ideas that can be con-
verted into valuable goods and services for con-
sumption either directly or indirectly. The World
Bank (2006) recently published a millennium cap-
ital assessment with monetary estimates of the
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13 The discussion in the next two paragraphs is based on life
expectancy data for 1950–2005 in World Population
Prospects: The 2006 Revision, Highlights, available online at:
http://esa.un.org/unpp/index.asp?panel=2.
A map of life expectancies for different countries in
2005–2010 is available in United Nations, Department of
Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2007:
Figure 7), and a map of life expectancies in 2005 using the
same data is available at: http://www.worldpolicy.org/
projects/globalrights/econrights/maps-life.html.
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social
Affairs, Population Division (2007: Figure 5) presents a graph
displaying the evolution of life expectancies for different geo-
graphic regions from 1950–2005.
14 Until a few years ago, Western countries propagandized
against the spraying of DDT to prevent endemic malaria in
Africa (Sidley, 2000; World Health Organisation, 2006); and
even today, the European Union threatens economic sanctions
against developing African countries that import genetically
modified grains (Clapp, 2005; Paarlberg, 2008) that would im-
prove nutrition (Trewavas, 2001; Miller and Conko, 2004).
South African President Thabo Mbeki long resisted the scien-
tific link between HIV and AIDS, and withheld retroviral
AIDS drugs from the populace even though they were provid-
ed free or cheaply by the major international drug companies
(Schneider and Fassin, 2002; Power, 2003).
15 Kenny (2005) also examines data on life expectancy for
England and India going back to the 13th century, and finds
that divergence in this measure started as early as the 15th cen-
tury and continued through the 19th century before reversing
near the start of the 20th century.
16 Our reviewer pointed out that the demographic transition
to smaller family sizes occurs after a population reaches high
per capita GDP, indicating that economic intangibles can lead
to at least some cultural intangibles.
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types of assets – natural, produced and intangible
– for 120 countries as of 2000. Because many of
these assets were not traded, the World Bank de-
veloped estimates of asset values by capitalising
the income being generated by these assets. The
World Bank’s (2006: 5–6) methodology is:
‘Total wealth, in line with economic theory, is
estimated as the present value of future con-
sumption. Produced capital stocks are derived
from historical investment data using a perpetu-
al inventory model (PIM). Natural resource
stock values are based upon country-level data
on physical stocks, and estimates of natural re-
source rents are based on world prices and local
costs. Intangible capital then is measured as the
difference between total wealth and the other
produced and natural stocks.’
The central finding, anticipated by Adam Smith,
is that intangible assets are the most important cat-
egory, averaging 78% of worldwide assets.17
Intangible capital comprises 59% of assets in low-
income countries, 68% in middle-income coun-
tries and 80% of assets in high-income OECD
countries.18 Produced capital comprises 18% of
worldwide assets, and has a similar share across
income levels, ranging from 16% in low-income
countries to 19% in high-income countries.
Natural capital comprises 26% of assets in low-in-
come countries (even excluding the oil states of
the Middle East), 13% in middle-income coun-
tries, and a meager 2% in high-income OECD
countries. While natural capital is only 2% of
wealth in high-income OECD countries, natural
capital per capita in high-income countries
($9,531) is still five times that in low-income
countries ($1,925). The per capita disparity in 
intangible assets is even greater: high-income
country citizens ($353,339) have 80 times the in-
tangible assets of low-income country citizens
($4,434). Thus, high-income countries have con-
siderably more assets of all types, generating much
greater gross national income.
The World Bank (2006) breaks down the esti-
mated intangible capital into human capital (raw
labour and unskilled labour), formal and informal
institutions (governance and social capital), for-
eign financial assets, and measurement error (for
total, produced or natural capital). The World Bank
(2006: Table 1.3) measures several proxies for
each of these components, and finds that three
proxies, years of schooling (human capital), rule of
law index (institutions) and foreign remittances
per capita (foreign assets), together explain 89% of
the cross-country variation in intangible assets per
capita. With an elasticity of 0.83, the rule of law is
the single most important component of intangible
capital variation.19 Hall and Jones (1999) also con-
clude that social capital is the most important
source of cross-country productivity differences.
Education is the second most important compo-
nent of intangible capital, with an elasticity of
0.53, while foreign remittances have an elasticity
of 0.12. These estimates are important because
they reveal that the most important intangible as-
sets across countries are either not owned (rule of
law) or owned by workers (human capital) and not
by firms. Thus, business organisations in high-
income countries have higher valuations largely
because their tangible assets enjoy the comple-
mentarities and synergies of these more valuable
intangibles.
The World Bank (2006: Table 1.4) also estimates
marginal returns to each of these intangible asset
components in different countries. It finds that in-
dividual components of intangible capital have
much larger returns in rich countries than poor
countries (seven- to eight-fold impact in high- vs.
middle-income countries), which results from both
higher levels of each of these assets and higher
complementarities between these assets. Thus, the
same level of investment can have vastly different
economic values across countries. For example, a
computer programmer from India (high human
capital) has vastly different value added in the US
vs. India, even holding direct investment in educa-
tion or cost constant.
The World Bank (2006) likely underestimates
the proportion of wealth attributable to intangibles.
The World Bank estimates the current net present
value (NPV) of natural and produced capital, but
does not recognise that absent prior intangibles
these would be much less valuable. The value of
natural resources depends on demand for them,
which in turn depends on uses that have been in-
vented for them. Until recently, natural gas emerg-
ing from oil wells used to be flared off as waste
until liquefaction technology enabled easier use
and created economic wealth. Natural resources
can also lack value because they cannot be brought
to market – North Sea oil was valueless until deep-
sea oil production technology was developed.
Thus, as Adam Smith long ago argued, even the
value of tangible assets emanates largely from
Vol. 38 No. 3 2008 International Accounting Policy Forum. 181
17 Smith (1776) starts his Introduction by saying: ‘The an-
nual labour of every nation is the fund which originally sup-
plies it with all the necessaries and conveniences of life which
it annually consumes.’ Smith recognised ‘the skill, dexterity,
and judgment with which [. . .] labour is generally applied’ as
a precondition for generating supply ‘whatever be the soil, cli-
mate, or extent of territory of any particular nation.’
18 The point estimate of 80% for OECD countries is quite
similar to Solow’s (1957) estimate that seven-eighths of US
productivity growth in the first half of 20th century was due to
technological change.
19 The elasticity measures the percentage change in intangi-
ble assets for a 1% change in a given proxy. Thus, a 1%
change in rule of law index between countries is associated
with a 0.83% change in intangible assets per capita.
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ideas (i.e. tangible assets embed intangibles).
While the World Bank emphasises political and
economic institutions, we note that social norms
and conventions also affect the growth of econom-
ic intangibles. For instance, social constraints and
occupational restrictions at birth, for example, in
the historical Indian caste system, can discourage
the pursuit of individual interests. North et al.
(2006) argue that open-access societies encourage
the flow of human capital between occupations,
and all else being equal, are more likely to reward
the young geniuses and master craftsmen whose
innovations increase societal wealth. This surplus
wealth in turn allows for the development of sci-
ence and seemingly irrelevant products, like art-
work, that emerge initially from hobbies (Jardine,
1996; Roberts, 2005; Szabo, 2005). To summarise
this subsection, the production of valuable eco-
nomic intangibles depends heavily on a host of
cultural, social, political, and economic institu-
tions, few of which are owned or controlled by 
individual firms.
5.3. Changes in accounting intangibles
Accounting intangibles are legal rights to exclu-
sively exploit an idea to generate cash inflows, and
include patents, trademarks and copyrights.
Accounting intangibles that are purchased in arm’s
length transactions are reported at acquisition val-
ues. However, most intangibles are internally de-
veloped, and because firms frequently use
informal mechanisms such as trade secrets and
marketing to protect their ideas, they cannot report
these assets on the balance sheet.20 Even if legally
protected, firms frequently report these assets on
their balance sheets at historical costs or nominal
amounts rather than at their market values. While
US accounting academics usually attribute this
conservative accounting to the expensing of R&D
expenditures mandated by SFAS 2 (FASB, 1975),
the US practice of reporting valuable intangibles at
conservative nominal values such as $1 goes back
at least as far as General Electric’s balance sheet of
1907 (Ely and Waymire, 1999b; Waymire and
Basu, 2008). In addition, intangibles are potential-
ly more susceptible to obsolescence or legal chal-
lenge, and their market values are more likely to
be state-dependent. Reported balance sheet values
thus can be unreliable guides to the value or im-
portance of accounting intangibles.21
An obvious alternative to balance sheet meas-
urements is to value intangibles based on the ac-
counting income they produce. Graham and
Meredith (1937: 23) state this view as:
‘In general, it may be said that little if any weight
should be given to the figures at which intangi-
bles assets appear on the balance sheet. Such in-
tangibles may have a very large value indeed,
but it is the income account and not the balance
sheet that offers the clue to this value. In other
words, it is the earning power of these intangi-
bles, rather than their balance sheet valuation,
that really counts.’
Intangibles usually generate income indirectly
through other assets and jointly with other intangi-
bles. Nordhaus (2004) estimates that on average
inventors capture less than 3% of the societal ben-
efits of their inventions. Customers, imitators and
other industry participants usually capture the re-
maining benefits. Teece (1987) argues that under a
‘weak appropriability regime’, most profits go to
the owners of specialised complementary assets
needed to commercialise an invention. The
strength of the appropriability regime is a function
of the strength of legal protections such as patents,
trademarks and copyrights (Teece, 1987); as well
as innovation characteristics – whether the knowl-
edge is tacit or codified, observable or non-ob-
servable in use, and whether it requires tangible
assets or not (Teece, 2003).
As discussed in the previous section, many valu-
able intangibles, such as rule of law, are not owned
by individual firms but instead are shared by all
citizens, and others, such as human capital, are
owned by employees and only rented by firms.22
Valuing accounting intangibles on a stand-alone
basis requires heroic assumptions about separabil-
ity, highly uncertain estimates of ambiguous future
benefits, and arbitrary allocations of jointly pro-
duced income. We question whether the often ex-
pressed need to value and report intangibles on
balance sheets is inherently a mirage that leads
down a path involving high measurement costs for
something that is not the focus of economic activ-
ity. In other words, since intangibles are usually
generated and used internally, and their comple-
mentarity with other firm intangibles implies that
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20 In a few special cases, such as well-recognised brands, in-
ternally developed intangibles can be reported at appraised
values (IAS 38: IASC, 1998), although this is not permitted in
the US.
21 Neither Adobe nor Microsoft has ever capitalised any
software development costs under SFAS 86 (FASB, 1985).
Similarly, large US oil and gas companies prefer to expense
rather than capitalise exploration costs, unlike their smaller
competitors, when firms could choose between the successful
efforts and full cost methods. This suggests that successful
companies report nominal balance sheet values for intangibles
to signal their financial strength, and statistical analyses in-
cluding these companies are likely to find a low or even neg-
ative correlation between reported intangible amounts and
their market values.
22 Advocates of capitalising human capital often point to the
$2.2 billion increase in Kodak’s market capitalisation after it
hired Christopher J. Steffen as Chief Financial Officer in
1993. Unfortunately for Kodak, he resigned after 11 weeks, at
which point the market value quickly shrank by over $2 bil-
lion (Merchant, 2006: 898–899). This example reinforces the
point that human capital is not owned by the firm but merely
rented.
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going concern values are likely quite different
from liquidation values, most valuations will nec-
essarily be highly subjective and inaccurate, and
ignored by market participants. In this sense,
World Bank estimates of the wealth of different
nations are merely adaptations of the longstanding
view that accurate valuations of business organisa-
tions are based on the income they produce rather
than ‘values’ attributed to their unique use of a
combination of assets.
Given the balance sheet measurement problems,
academic researchers have resorted to indirect
measures to illustrate the importance of account-
ing intangibles. Baruch Lev (2001: 8), for exam-
ple, pointed to the S&P 500 market-to-book ratio
of equity of 6 in March 2001 as evidence that ac-
counting intangibles were both highly important
and poorly accounted for, assuming that the miss-
ing book values were all due to unrecorded ac-
counting intangibles. Figure 2 shows the time
series of Tobin’s q for US firms from 1950 to
2006. In this graph, the market-to-book ratio of as-
sets peaks at over 1.7 in the late 1990s, having
risen dramatically from about 1.2 in the early
1990s. However, the graph also indicates that the
market-to-book ratio exceeded one for some time
in the 1960s, indicating that the 1990s values were
not unique. Furthermore, even though the market-
to-book ratio was near one for much of the 1970s,
following the 1973 oil crisis, it is difficult to be-
lieve that firms such as Coca-Cola or Kodak did
not have valuable accounting intangibles in that era.
In retrospect, an alternative interpretation of
Figure 2 is that the high market-to-book values of
the 1990s resulted from a market bubble in
Internet stocks, and in high-technology firms more
generally. Warren Buffett pointed out at the time
that the 1990s were reminiscent of the 1920s elec-
tricity, automobile and chemicals boom. Studying
the US automobile industry, Carroll and Hannan
(2000: 347) found ‘that an astonishing number of
hopeful producers populated the early industry’
and that ‘much selection occurred prior to actual
production’. They identify 3,485 preproduction or-
ganising attempts in the automobile industry. Of
these, only 11% succeeded in making the transi-
tion to the production stage. This evidence is sim-
ilar to the low success rates for pharmaceutical
initial public offerings in the late 20th century.
Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) describe the
evolution of the US automobile tyre industry dur-
ing the first half of the 20th century. Similar to the
automobile industry, there was a rapid increase in
the number of automobile tire manufacturers be-
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Figure 2
Tobin’s q for the US stock market 1950–2006
The graph shows the market-wide Tobin’s q statistic for the US stock market for the years 1950 to 2006. The
market-wide Tobin’s q is calculated from data available on Compustat. Following Gompers, Ishii and Metrick
(2003), each firm’s q is the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets (Compustat data item
6), where the market value of assets is computed as book value of assets plus the market value of common
stock less the sum of the book value of common stock (Compustat data item 60) and balance sheet deferred
taxes (Compustat item 74). The market value of common stock is computed as the Common Shares
Outstanding (Compustat item 25) multiplied by Price – Fiscal Year – Close (Compustat item 199). These firm-
specific values were then averaged for a given year based on fiscal year data. We used a weighted average
based on market values.
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tween 1910 and 1920 that followed the rising in-
dustry share price relative to the market index.
However, the number of tyre manufacturers fell
precipitously after the mid-1920s, lagging a few
years after the industry share prices. Over time, the
number of manufacturers continued to drop even as
total sales climbed. Their Figure 1 illustrates a
‘winner takes all’ pattern that often characterises
the advent of new technologies. The extreme posi-
tive skewness of returns to tire manufacturing was
similar to the returns realised by information tech-
nology firms in the 1990s. Gort and Klepper (1982)
show that the introduction of many major new
technologies generated similar industry patterns. In
winner-take-all situations where most firms are
likely to entirely lose their investments, it is ar-
guably more informative to report these intangible
investments at their most likely value of zero rather
than an unrepresentative mean or average value.
But even ignoring the issue of technological
change, we suggest that a more plausible reason for
the variation in market-to-book ratios over time is
changes in the value of non-accounting economic
intangibles, such as improvements in government
functioning and the impact of deregulation. Market
valuations reflect the income expected to be gener-
ated by the firm’s owned assets in conjunction with
those assets that they share with other firms in the
industry or the economy (e.g. government protec-
tion from competition via tariffs or selective regu-
lation). In other words, it may not even be the
firm’s own assets that generate the added value.
Another piece of evidence that Lev (2001: 100)
presents is a graph from Lev and Zarowin (1999)
showing a declining earnings-return correlation
from 1980–1995 as measured by R2s. Lev and
Zarowin (1999), among others, argue that this R2
decline indicates the increased importance of in-
tangibles because current GAAP requires the im-
mediate expensing of valuable investments. Ely
and Waymire (1999a: Figure 1) show the earnings-
return R2 for a randomly chosen sample of 100
NYSE-listed firms for each year from 1927 to
1993. Consistent with Lev and Zarowin, Ely and
Waymire (1999a) document that earnings and
change in earnings explain about 20% of variation
in stock returns across firms in the mid-1980s but
close to zero by the early 1990s.
However, Ely and Waymire (1999a) also demon-
strate that the decreasing trend during the 1990s
was part of a broader FASB era decline, and the
FASB era decline resembles an earlier decline
under CAP during the 1940s and 1950s, again sug-
gesting that the 1990s were not an aberration in re-
lation to a longer time series. A subsequent study
by Ryan and Zarowin (2003) finds that virtually all
of the post-1950 decline in R2 is due to (1) the
stock market becoming more efficient (lower trad-
ing costs, etc.) and (2) increased accounting con-
servatism (a more non-linear relation between
earnings and returns), and that increasing intangi-
bles do not explain these trends. In sum, academic
accounting research provides little evidence to
support the argument that the average value of ac-
counting intangibles has increased disproportion-
ately in recent years.
There is evidence to suggest that the number of
accounting intangibles has increased over time,
but it is unclear whether this translates into 
more valuable accounting intangibles. The World
Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO, 2007)
has recently collated and published data on patent
and trademark filings and grants from patent of-
fices around the world.23 WIPO (2007: 11) shows
the time series of worldwide patent filings for nine
patent offices starting in 1883 and ending in 2005.
Worldwide patent filings grew at a 1.99% rate
from 1883 to 1959, with growth being most 
pronounced for the US, Germany, the UK and
France. From 1960 to 2005, worldwide patent fil-
ings grew by 3.35% annually, largely because of
increases in Japan and Russia. Growth during
1995–2005 was even greater, at 4.7% per year,
with the most rapid growth occurring in South
Korea and China.24 As of 2005, patents are still
highly concentrated, with 77% of filings and 74%
of grants accounted for by five patent offices
(China, Japan, European Patent Office, the
Republic of Korea and the US). Thus, patent ac-
tivity is concentrated in industrialised countries,
similar to the pattern for economic and cultural in-
tangibles described in Sections 5.1 and 5.2.25
Data trends for trademark application filings
worldwide from 1883–2005 are similar to those
described above for patents.26 Trademark applica-
tions worldwide grew at 4% per year from 1883 to
184 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
23 Nard and Morriss (2006) use a public choice perspective
to analyse the history of patent law from its beginnings in the
Venetian patent statute of 1474 through the English 1624
Statute of Monopolies to the Intellectual Property clause of the
US Constitution and the US Patent Act of 1790. Nicita and
Ramello (2007) review the history of copyright law beginning
with the English Statue of Queen Anne of 1710.
24 While some of this growth is due to multiple patent ap-
plications in different jurisdictions, the European Patent
Convention in 1977 and the International Patent Cooperating
Treaty in 1978 have reduced some duplication. Patent counts
are also affected by legal and administrative differences be-
tween national and regional patent systems, although these
systems are converging due to international treaties and agree-
ments. Alternatives to standard patent applications, such as
provisional applications, utility models or industrial designs,
may result in fewer standard patent applications in some coun-
tries.
25 Of the estimated 5.6 million patents in force at the end of
2005, Japanese and US entities owned 49%. Japan and South
Korea have far and away the highest number of patent filings
per capita or per unit of GDP (measured in constant year 2000
US dollars at purchasing power parity).
26 http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/marks/applica-
tions/office.html.
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1959, and at 5.4% per year from 1960 to 2005. As
with patents, trademark applications were concen-
trated in Europe, Japan and the US up to 1960.
South Korea and China began trademark filings in
1963 and 1982, respectively, and quickly moved
up the international rankings, with China in recent
years having more than twice as many trademark
applications as any other country. Both the trade-
mark and patent filings data indicate that the num-
ber of accounting intangibles is trending up
through time.27
At the same time, an increase in the frequency of
patent and trademark filings does not automatical-
ly translate into valuable intangibles, especially for
developing country filings. Moser (2004) finds
that countries with patent systems (and those with
longer patent terms) were no more innovative than
countries without patent systems in the mid-19th
century, as measured by the number of innovations
per country judged important by experts at World
Fairs during 1851–1876. The WIPO data clearly
suggests that patents, trademarks and other ac-
counting intangibles tend to accompany industrial-
isation and economic development, and may in
large part reflect improved legal institutions rather
than acceleration in the number or value of eco-
nomic or cultural intangibles. As a result, account-
ing intangibles may not have become dramatically
more important relative to economic or cultural in-
tangibles, although there is considerable regional
variation.
Moreover, there are reasons to believe that over-
ly broad patent law can hinder innovation (Jaffe
and Lerner, 2006). Jaffe and Lerner (2006: 2)
argue that the new US Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (CAFC) ‘interpreted patent law to
make it easier to get patents, easier to enforce
patents against others, easier to get large financial
awards from such infringements, and harder for
those accused of infringing patents to challenge
the patents’ validity.’28 As a result, US patents
have been granted for obvious or long-existing
ideas such as ‘Method for Swinging on a Swing’
to a five-year-old, ‘one-click shopping’ to
Amazon.com, and an ‘expirationless option’ to
MBA Virgil Daugherty for Paul Samuelson’s re-
search two decades earlier (Jaffe and Lerner,
2006). These US developments are important be-
cause of an international covergence effort starting
with the 1994 international agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS), which is strongly influenced by the US
system.29
Many of the new patent filings may actually
overlap with existing patents. Heller and
Eisenberg (1998) argue that the large number of
overlapping patent grants creates an ‘anticom-
mons’ problem that will slow down biomedical re-
search because innovators are increasingly wary of
being asked for onerous royalty payments or fac-
ing costly patent litigation. Jaffe and Lerner (2006:
Figure 2) show that patent litigation has increased
dramatically since 1982. Bessen and Meurer
(2008) estimate that except for the pharmaceutical
and chemical industries, US publicly traded firms
in the last decade on average experienced a net
wealth reduction if they filed patents because of
patent litigation. US accounting standard-setters
should develop standards for patent liabilities
(similar to asset retirement obligations) if they
want to stay true to their favoured balance sheet
approach! Non-meritorious product litigation is, of
course, a much broader danger to product innova-
tion in the US (Jaffe and Lerner, 2006).30
Even if valuable economic intangibles are more
prevalent today, accounting intangibles may not
have similarly increased because of changes in so-
cial norms regarding sharing of ideas and intangi-
bles. Large parts of the software industry are
organised under a communitarian ‘open source’ or
‘free software’ or ‘copyleft’ model that has pro-
duced major software innovations such as Netscape,
Linux and Apache. These innovations are deliber-
ately unprotected under intellectual property law
and compete with copyrighted or patented software.
From an economic perspective, these arrangements
would reduce the value of accounting intangibles
actually reported on balance sheets. The illegal
sharing of music and videos using Napster and
YouTube makes it more difficult to collect royalties
but also facilitates viral marketing, making their net
impact on the value of intangibles difficult to pre-
dict (Liebowitz, 2005; Varian, 2005).
A final perspective on the importance of intangi-
bles is that despite rapid growth after World War II
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27 WIPO also compiles worldwide data on utility models,
petty patents, industrial designs, plant varieties and microor-
ganisms, but the patent and trademark data is likely to capture
the most important accounting intangibles.
28 The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 encouraging universities to
patent federally funded research and then license the patents
(Rai and Eisenberg, 2003). In the early 1990s, Congress made
the US Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) self-financing,
creating incentives to loosen patenting standards to increase
application fees.
29 Contrary to popular opinion and the business press, US
movie producers lose far more to piracy per capita in devel-
oped countries like the US, Canada and the European Union
than they do in developing countries like China, Russia and
India (Schwabach, 2007). It is ironic that the US is so mili-
tantly pursuing intellectual property piracy when it was itself
one of the biggest offenders until very recently.
30 Onerous government regulation can also have negative
consequences for the rate of innovation in an economy. For ex-
ample, Peltzman (1973) argues that restrictive FDA regulation
has overly slowed the introduction of new drugs in the US and
imposed large welfare losses as a result. Gieringer (1985: 188)
estimates, ‘At this rate, it follows that a one-year delay in new
drug benefits would cost 37,000 to 76,000 lives per decade in
the US population … By comparison, FDA delays in approv-
ing new drugs have often been estimated at two years or more.’
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in education and R&D investments, economic
growth has not increased in the US or the OECD
countries (Jones, 1995). In cross-country regres-
sions, intellectual property rights have little impact
on economic growth even though general property
rights institutions have a substantial impact
(Bessen and Meurer, 2008). These observations
are consistent with the ‘burden of knowledge’ ar-
gument that innovation is becoming more difficult
as the body of knowledge requiring mastery con-
tinues to expand (Jones, 2007b), with new innova-
tions being narrower and providing smaller
advances than before (Andolfatto and MacDonald,
1998). This evidence is consistent with the view
that all factors of production, even knowledge, are
subject eventually to the law of diminishing mar-
ginal returns.
6. Conclusions
We analyse accounting intangibles from a broad
historical and international perspective, arguing
that a narrow focus on particular time periods or
regions often leads to a woefully incomplete view
of intangibles. Our analysis indicates that human
societies have produced useful ideas for thousands
of years all around the world, and that the knowl-
edge assets labelled as intangibles are ubiquitous
to human economic interaction. Thus, analysing
whether accounting intangibles have become more
important recently requires examining a broad set
of benchmarks for comparison.
We analyse the process by which cultural ideas
become converted into valuable economic goods
and services and eventually into legally protected
property rights that can be reported as accounting
intangibles. We find that few ideas attain the status
of private property rights, even in developed coun-
tries, which reflects social norms for sharing as
well as slowly developing property-rights technol-
ogy. In addition, companies may prefer to ostenta-
tiously undervalue intangible assets on their
balance sheets to signal their economic soundness.
As a result, the importance of reported accounting
intangibles might not track the importance of the
broader sets of cultural and economic intangibles.
Accounting intangibles, because they usually
improve pre-existing tangible goods and services,
are also not separable from the other concurrent in-
tangibles incorporated into these tangible assets, or
even the past innovations that led to the creation of
these assets. Similarly, many intangibles will be
incorporated into many as yet undeveloped future
tangible assets.
Ideas are economically valuable if they increase
the wealth of those using them, which implies that
the value of intangibles derives from the income
they produce. However, intangibles usually gener-
ate income indirectly through other tangible assets,
or jointly with other intangibles that are often
owned by others, and are often rendered obsolete
by unpredictable technological advances. Many
complementary intangibles, such as rule of law,
are not owned by any single entity but instead are
shared, and others, such as human capital, are
owned by employees and only rented by firms.
Stand-alone valuations of accounting intangibles
thus require heroic assumptions about separability,
highly uncertain estimates of ambiguous future
benefits, and arbitrary allocations of jointly pro-
duced income both within and across firms.
Our analysis implies that accounting practice has
evolved well-functioning norms and practices for
reporting intangibles. The few ideas that are se-
curely protected by property rights and have val-
ues authenticated by market exchange are reported
at acquisition values. In a few other cases, such as
well-recognised brands, they can be reported at ap-
praised values, but the more usual practice is to re-
port intangibles at historical cost with the tacit
understanding that these are lower bounds on their
market values. Because the income statement ulti-
mately captures all wealth generation regardless of
source, reported income provides the single most
important input to forecasting future income and
estimating a firm’s intrinsic value (Liu et al.,
2007).
While standard-setters may be tempted to leave
their mark upon posterity by altering accounting
practice for intangibles, our analysis suggests that
they, like Don Quixote, are likely tilting at wind-
mills. Ferguson (1767) pointed out that many
human institutions such as the market economy are
‘the result of human action, but not the execution
of any human design’, and that frequently the for-
mer are superior. Because accounting practice like
language and the market system has evolved along
with the human mind, it incorporates far more in-
formation and evolves in a more complex manner
than any single regulator, or even a committee of
regulators, could begin to possibly comprehend
(Hayek, 1979). Businesses that follow accounting
rules that have been filtered through successive
generations tend to survive and prosper, even
though their managers and owners may not realise
why (Byrne, 1937). Just as valuable innovation in
science or technology is best accomplished by in-
dividual trial and error rather than by regimented
lock-step dogma, so accounting standard-setters
could likely better serve the public interest by let-
ting market processes select appropriate account-
ing for intangibles.31 Using simplistic and naïve
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31 Two days after our presentation at the Information for
Better Markets conference on 17 December, 2007, the FASB
decided not to add a project on intangible assets to its agenda.
See: http://www.fasb.org/action/aa122807.shtml. The IASB
also decided not to add a project on intangible assets to its
agenda in December 2007. See: http://www.iasplus.com/
agenda/agenda.htm.
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conceptual frameworks to regulate complex adap-
tive systems, like financial markets and accounting
practices, is likely a recipe for negative unintend-
ed consequences.
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